We use a unique dataset of 126 privatized firms from 25 countries between 1987 and 2003 to investigate the political determinants of the cost of equity. We find strong, robust evidence that the cost of equity is increasing in government control, while controlling for other determinants of the cost of equity. We also find that the cost of equity is significantly related to the political system and to the government's tenure. Overall, our research suggests that the government's control rights and political characteristics determine the privatized firm's equity financing costs.
Introduction
In this paper, we investigate the political determinants of the cost of equity in the context of privatization. The privatization context is interesting for many reasons. Privatization is accompanied by a drastic change in ownership structure and thus allows us to study more formally the dynamic link between the (new) ownership structure (and hence new corporate governance) and the newly privatized firm's cost of equity. This switch from state to private ownership, which is accompanied by severe information asymmetry problems (Denis and McConnell (2003) and Dyck (2001) ), also provides us with a unique setting in which we can investigate new determinants of the cost of equity: Specifically, the privatization context allows us to examine if and to what extent, political institutions that characterize the government (being simultaneously the residual owner and the issuer) matter to shareholders. To study this issue, we examine how government control and the political characteristics of the privatizing government may affect the cost of equity. More generally, we attempt to answer the following questions: Do shareholders consider post-privatization government control a risk factor and does such control influence privatized firms' cost of equity? Do the political characteristics of the privatizing government (e.g., its political leaning, its prevailing political system, and its stability) also affect the cost of equity? In other words, are political factors priced in this setting?
This study, which is the first to analyze how government control and the political environment affect the implied cost of equity for firms operating in a wide set of countries, extends recent research on the link between political economy and corporate governance to include the role of government ownership. We focus on government control in privatized firms for two reasons. First, government ownership is a key dimension of the post-privatization corporate governance structure. Indeed, most privatization transactions in developing countries and most initial privatizations in developed countries take place gradually (Perotti and Guney (1993) ), allowing governments to remain shareholders in the vast majority of privatized firms (e.g., Bortolotti and Faccio (2007) ). Furthermore, government ownership has unique features, because, unlike typical shareholders, governments pursue political objectives that rarely coincide with profit maximization. In partial privatizations, where existing links between politicians and managers of the former state-owned firms are seldom completely severed, it is unrealistic to expect that unscrupulous politicians could be prevented from grabbing lucrative deals. In such situations, we face acute agency problems and extensive political entrenchment that may affect the firm's cost of equity, as required by other shareholders. This study of privatized firms breaks new ground in that it views political economy as embedded in the firm's management and operations, thus making them a natural laboratory for testing the link between political economy and the cost of equity capital.
Indeed, privatization is shaped by political concerns and motives. In their political view of privatization, Boycko et al. (1996) argue that the transfer of control over SOEs from the government to private owners will decrease or remove political interference and thus should lower the risk that shareholders' wealth might be expropriated. A primary prediction is that shareholders will demand lower returns on the shares of a privatized firm with a lower level of government control. Perotti (1995) and Biais and Perotti (2002) show how, in theory, the government's credibility and commitment to privatization, in particular, and market-oriented policies, in general, will determine the way the process is conducted as well as the expected level of post-privatization policy risk. According to Perotti's model, the committed government which undertakes privatization for its expected micro-and macro-economic benefits should be associated with lower policy risk once the firm is privatized. Biais and Perotti (2002) in turn argue that building confidence and credibility are influential factors in the privatization process:
Right-wing governments are more likely to apply market oriented policies and tend to be more committed than left-wing governments. Hence, privatization by right-wing governments should be associated with a lower policy risk. All these models suggest that, even if the government still holds a residual stake, potential shareholders will accept a lower return on the newly privatized companies' shares if they anticipate less policy risk after divestiture.
To date, the question as to whether state ownership inhibits or stimulates postprivatization performance is still under debate. On the one hand, Boardman and Vining (1989) report that partially privatized firms underperform fully privatized firms and state-owned enterprises. In the same vein, Boubakri and Cosset (1998) find that the post-privatization performance of firms in developing countries increases more when the government relinquishes control. On the other hand, D 'Souza et al. (2005) document that state ownership of firms in developed countries induces more capital spending, while Gupta (2005) , echoing this evidence, shows that partially privatized Indian firms post higher profits after divestiture. We contribute to this debate by examining the potential effect of government control on the privatized firm's equity financing costs and, more generally, the possible effects of institutions and politics on resource allocations during the dramatic regime shift imposed by privatization.
Rather than focusing on performance and value as in earlier studies, we choose to focus on the cost of equity for three main reasons. First, good corporate governance may improve the firm's valuation by stemming the diversion of its cash flows (e.g., Claessens et al. (2002) and Gompers et al. (2003) ). Corporate governance can also affect firm value through the discount rate of the firm's expected future cash flows (i.e., the cost of equity). 1 Examining the latter link through which corporate governance may affect firm value is important, because, as it is a direct measure of the external equity financing costs, the discount rate determines the firm's financing and investing decisions (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (2003) ). Second, Suchard et al., (2007) argue that, unlike Tobin Q, the cost of equity is based on the firm's current operation risk and is less likely to be exposed to the exogenous factors that affect the firm's growth opportunities.
Therefore, the cost of equity is a more accurate measure of the changes in the firm's governance environments. Finally, the cost of equity captures the firm's agency and information asymmetry problems (e.g., Easley and O'Hara (2004) and Lambert, et al. (2007) ).
Using a unique multinational sample of 126 privatized from 25 countries between 1987 and 2003, we find strong and robust evidence that the cost of equity is increasing in government control, while also controlling for other determinants of the cost of equity. Our results also show that the cost of equity of newly privatized firms is significantly related to government stability (tenure) and the political system. More specifically, we find evidence that firms from countries with more democratic and more stable governments enjoy a lower cost of equity. Therefore, our findings suggest that the presence of sound political institutions will lower the rate of return shareholders require for holding equity in privatized firms.
Our paper contributes to the literature on several grounds: First, it contributes to the recent literature on the role of corporate governance in determining the firm's cost of equity, by introducing the corporate governance role that the government plays as a shareholder. Second, by investigating the political determinants of the cost of equity, it adds to the burgeoning literature on the political economy of corporate finance (e.g., Durnev and Fauver (2007) and Bushman et al. (2004) ). Third, it contributes to the privatization literature which, to date, has provided few insights into the external financing costs of newly privatized firms. 2 Finally, it contributes to the debate on the link between government ownership/control and the firm's performance by examining instead the impact of government control on the cost of equity of newly privatized firms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the related literature and develop our hypothesis. Section 3 describes the sample and the construction of the implied cost of equity estimates, and provides descriptive information about the control structure of our sample of privatized firms. Section 4 presents our main empirical evidence and reports the results of our sensitivity analysis. Section 5 summarizes our findings and concludes.
Related Literature and Hypotheses

Government Control and the Cost of Equity
In the literature, the impact of state ownership on post-privatization performance is still a topic of debate. On the one hand, the political view implies that state ownership is associated with post-privatization political interference (Boycko et al. (1996) and Shleifer and Vishny (1994) ). The proponents of this view argue that managers in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) may be swayed to pursue government leaders' political objectives, rather than to maximize profits.
Typical evidence of this pursuit of political objectives would include maintaining a high level of employment and promoting regional development by locating production in politically desirable rather than economically attractive regions. Boycko et al. (1996) argue that a greater emphasis will be put on profits and efficiency only if privatization transfers control and ownership from the government to private shareholders, who will then strive to maximize firm value. In the same vein, Paudyal et al. (1998) argue that the level of post-privatization political interference and the risk of renationalization will both be higher when the government sells a relatively low percentage of its capital. Therefore, the "political interference" hypothesis implies that greater government control is associated with a higher agency risk and will thus lower postprivatization corporate performance or firm value. According to this argument, government control and the cost of equity should be positively related.
Several empirical studies support the predictions of the political interference hypothesis. Boardman and Vining (1989) compare the performance of the private firms, SOEs, and partially privatized firms listed among the 500 largest non-US industrial firms. They report that partially privatized firms underperform private firms and SOEs. Similarly, Boubakri and Cosset (1998) find that, in developing countries, post-privatization performance improves more when the government relinquishes control. More recently, Fan et al. (2007) document lower accounting and post-IPO long-term performances for privatized Chinese firms, when the government maintains control through political connections.
On the other hand, state ownership may be positively related to firm performance/valuation because it carries an implicit guarantee of government bail outs (i.e., a soft-budget constraint). For example, Wang et al. (2008) argue that, because they can appeal to soft-budget constraints when they encounter financial difficulties, SOEs have lower incentives to report higher quality accounting information in order to obtain better contracting terms. Faccio et al. (2006) find that politically connected firms are more likely to be bailed out than nonpolitically connected peers. In the same vein, Charumilind et al. (2006) show that Thai firms with connections to banks and politicians obtained more long-term loans and needed less collateral during the period preceding the Asian financial crisis of 1997 compared to firms without such connections. According to this view, the cost of equity should be positively associated with government control.
Overall, because the literature provides two competing predictions about the impact of government control on privatized firms' cost of equity, our first hypothesis is non-directional and states:
The cost of equity is related to the control rights held by the government, all else being equal. Perotti (1995) and Biais and Perotti (2002) suggest that the government's credibility and its commitment to privatization will command the way the process is conducted as well as the expected level of policy risk. Policy risk arises from post-privatization policies that may be applied by the government (e.g., deregulation, enactment of new legislations, and new administrative procedures) and could affect the allocation of previously established rights.
The Political Characteristics of the Government and the Cost of Equity
Several characteristics of the privatizing government may be related to policy risk. The government's political orientation may determine the level of post-privatization policy risk.
Left-wing governments are more likely to intervene in the economy and to affect the postprivatization valuation by issuing policy changes that modify shareholders' control and income rights. In the view of Biais and Perotti (2002) , left-wing governments are less likely to apply market-oriented policies and tend to be less committed than right-wing governments. We therefore expect policy risk to be higher in countries with left-wing governments.
The political system may also determine the level of post-privatization policy risk.
Democratic governments are more likely to introduce market-supporting reforms and thus should be more committed to privatization. Therefore, democratic governments should be less inclined to interfere with the operations of newly privatized firms (NPFs) through regulation or renationalization. As argued by Banerjee and Munger (2004, p.220) , democracy also changes the incentives for rent-seeking. They note: "The checks and balances penalize self-interested politicians and hence limiting rent-seeking opportunities." Consequently, minority shareholders should face a lower level of policy risk in countries with more democratic governments.
In addition, government stability may determine the level of post-privatization policy risk. High government turnover will increase the likelihood of policy reversals. Furthermore, governments uncertain about their chances of being re-elected may engage in sub-optimal policies in order to worsen the state of the economy to be inherited by a successor. Therefore, the policy risk faced by the shareholders of NPFs should be higher in countries with unstable governments. In light of this discussion suggesting that the political characteristics of the government determine the level of post-privatization policy risk, we can derive our second hypothesis:
The cost of equity is related to the political characteristics of the privatizing government, all else being equal.
Data and Variables
Sample Construction
We obtain the list of privatized firms from several sources such as the World Bank privatization database for developing countries, the Privatization Barometer for OECD countries, and Megginson's (2003) updated list of privatized firms in developed and developing countries.
We follow the usual practice of eliminating firms from ex-communist countries and China (e.g., Megginson et al. (2004) and Bortolotti and Faccio (2007) ). 3 Next, we hand match this database on the details of privatization with I/B/E/S and Worldscope, which we use to collect data on contemporaneous stock prices, analysts' earnings forecasts, and financial data, respectively, for our post-privatization period of five years i.e., from the year following the privatization to five years after privatization.
For each observation we require: (i) a positive one-year-ahead and two-year-ahead earnings forecasts, (ii) either a three-year-ahead positive earnings forecast or a long-term growth rate forecast, (iii) a contemporaneous price per share, and (iv) a positive book value from Worldscope. Analysts' forecasts and stock prices are measured as of the fiscal year-end + 10 months while financial data is measured as of the fiscal year-end. 4 All items are denominated in local currency. Next, we implement the four models of the implied cost of equity described in the appendix and exclude firm-year observations if: (i) the inflation rate for the country in that year is above 25%, (ii) one of the cost of equity models does not converge or is not defined, (iii) we do not have data on the firm's ultimate ownership structure. We end up with a final sample of 126 firms privatized in 25 countries over the 1987-2003 period. 5 
Cost-of-Equity Estimates
One measure of the cost of equity commonly used in the asset pricing literature is the expost realized return. However, this measure has been criticized in the recent finance literature (e.g., Fama and French (1997) and Elton (1999) ). For example, Elton (1999) argues that the realized return is a poor and potentially biased proxy for the cost of equity. 8 Additionally, Fama and French (1997) conclude that the single-factor, capital-asset pricing model and the FamaFrench three-factor model produce imprecise cost-of-equity estimates. 9 An alternative cost-ofequity proxy widely used in the recent accounting and finance literature (e.g., Botosan and find that the cost-of-equity estimates from the four models are highly correlated and that the GLS model exhibits the lowest pair-wise correlation coefficients. Panel C, which reports descriptive statistics on the implied cost of equity (R AVG ) by country, shows differences on R AVG between countries. R AVG ranges from 8.74% in New Zealand to 18.30% in Brazil.
Insert Table 2 about here 9 Fama and French (1997) find that the cost of equity estimates based on the single-capital asset pricing model and their three-factor model are characterized by large standard errors.
Explanatory Variables
Control Structure.
To measure the ultimate control (voting) rights of the largest shareholders of our sample firms, we hand collected data on the ultimate ownership structure, mainly from annual reports. We also used additional sources such as Worldscope and the Asian and Brazilian handbooks. We used the approach described in La Porta et al. (1999) , Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) to determine the ultimate control structure of privatized firms.
In this study, corporate ownership is measured by cash-flow rights, and control is measured by voting rights. Following Bortolotti and Faccio (2007), we define a large shareholder as an entity which holds directly or indirectly at least 10% of the privatized firms' voting rights.
This approach accounts for ownership leveraging devices, namely: pyramids, dual-class shares, cross-holdings, and multiple control chains. These devices allow the largest shareholders to obtain excess control (control rights in excess of ownership rights). Using this approach allows us to tackle the problem of understatement of government control over NPFs. Indeed, the government may divest more than 50% of the privatized firm and yet still control the firm indirectly, for example through a pyramidal ownership structure that involves other stateowned-firms.
Following the above cited studies on ultimate ownership, we classify the largest ultimate owner of each firm under the six following types: (i) State, (ii) Family, (iii) Widely held corporation, (iv) Widely held financial institution, (v) Miscellaneous, and (vi) Cross-holdings. Table 3 reports descriptive information on the control structure of our sample firms over the period from year 0 to year +5. Panel A reports the percentage of firms controlled by each type of ultimate owner. In each of the six years, the largest ultimate owner of the privatized firms is most frequently the state. This evidence is consistent with Bortolotti and Faccio's (2007) findings for privatized firms from developed countries: the state is the largest ultimate owner in both of the two years for which they collected ultimate ownership data, i.e., 1997 and 2000.
Five years after privatization, the government is the largest ultimate owner in 68.96% of our sample firms. Thus, even five years after privatization, the government is the largest ultimate owner in almost two-thirds of the sample firms. The second most frequent type of ultimate owner is Family. Families control on average 7.66% of our sample firms during the post-privatization window. 5.54% of our sample firms do not have a large shareholder under the 10% threshold, and are classified as widely held. The percentage of widely held firms increases from 3.74% in year +1 to 10.34% in year +5. The largest owner is also frequently a widely held corporation. Widely held corporations control, on average, 5.11% of our sample firms over the post-privatization window. Panel B reports descriptive information on the control enhancing mechanisms used by the government in firms in which it is the largest ultimate owner. During the post-privatization window, 49.45% of privatized firms in which the government is the largest ultimate owner use at least one of the enhancing control mechanisms. Globally, we find that the state is the largest ultimate owner in the post-privatization period. Panel C provides descriptive statistics on the ultimate control rights held by the government. The statistics indicate a decline in government control rights over the post-privatization window. The mean government voting rights decline from 44.98% in year +1 to 32.72% in year +5, which is equivalent to a shift of 27.26%. Interestingly, we note that the government was the ultimate controlling shareholder (more than 50% of shares) in 95.35% of the sample firms before privatization. The percentage of firms in which the government is the ultimate controlling shareholder is also high during the post-privatization period. It ranges from 89.77% in year +1 to 77.05% in year+5.
Insert Table 3 Political regime (SYSTEM): This index is a proxy for the type of political systemdemocratic versus authoritarian. A higher score indicates more democratic governments. More democratic governments should be more inclined to set up market supporting institutions.
Furthermore, as Banerjee and Munger (2004) argue, more democratic governments are more likely to counteract the rent-seeking incentives of their politicians. Therefore, more democratic governments should be associated with a lower policy risk. Hence a lower cost of equity.
Government tenure (YRSOFFC):
We employ the number of years that the chief has been in office. This variable measures the credibility of the government and its ability to implement economic reforms and privatization (Cukierman and Leviatan (1992) and Banerjee and Munger (2004) ), which both lower the post-privatization policy risk faced by shareholders (Perotti (1995) ). Hence a lower cost of equity.
Institutional Variables.
Recent empirical studies emphasize the important role the institutional environment plays in protecting minority shareholders' rights (e.g., Hail and Leuz (2006) , among others). They report evidence suggesting that sound institutions and extensive disclosure standards are associated with lower agency risk and with lower equity financing costs. We rely on the following institutional variables that are likely to affect the cost of equity of privatized firms:
Risk of Government Expropriation (GOV_EXPROP): This index from La Porta et al.
(1998) measures the risk of outright confiscation or forced nationalization by the state. Recent studies use this index as a proxy for the degree of state involvement in the economy and government predation (e.g., Bushaman and Piotroski (2006) and Durnev and Fauver (2007) ). It ranges from 0 to 10-higher scores indicating a lower probability that government will interfere in the economy to extract rents for self enrichment. We expect a negative association between the cost of equity and the government risk-of-expropriation index.
Law and Order (LAW_ORDER):
This index from ICRG measures the country's law and order situation. The index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher scores indicating sound political institutions and a strong court system. We expect a negative association between the cost of equity and the country's law-and-order index.
Accounting Standards (DISCLOSURE): This variable from La Porta et al. (1998) is an
indicator of disclosure standards based on the inclusion or omission of 90 items in the annual reports. A higher score indicates extensive disclosure standards. We expect a negative association between the cost of equity and the accounting standards index.
Anti-self Dealing (ANTISELF): This index is a new measure of legal protection developed by Djankov et al. (2008) . The index ranges from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating better legal protection of minority shareholders. We expect a negative association between the cost of equity and the anti-self dealing index.
Control Variables.
Following the recent empirical literature on the cost of equity, we control for the following risk and control variables:
Firm size (SIZE): Fama and French (1992) suggest that the cost of equity is negatively related to the firm's size. Hail and Leuz (2006) document that the implied cost of equity is negatively and significantly related to the firm's size. We use the logarithm of the firm's total assets in US dollar as our proxy for the firm's size and we expect a negative association between the cost of equity and SIZE.
Volatility of Stock Returns (RETURN_VOL):
The CAPM suggests that the market beta should be positively associated with the cost of equity. However, in the tests that use realized returns (e.g., Fama and French, 1992; 1997) , the estimated cost of equity using beta is found to be imprecise. Furthermore, some empirical studies on the cost of equity (Gebhardt et al. (2001) and Lee et al. (2004) , among others) document no association (or even a negative one) between the implied cost of equity and the market beta. In addition, Hail and Leuz (2006) find that stockreturn variability explains cross-country differences in the cost of equity better than does the market beta. Thus, we use stock-return volatility rather than the market beta to measure market risk. Lee et al. (2004), and Hail and Leuz (2006) find that stock-return variability is positively related to the cost of equity. Consequently, we expect a positive association between stockreturn volatility and the implied cost of equity.
Leverage (LEVRAGE): Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that, without taxes and transaction costs, the firm's cost of equity is an increasing function of its debt ratio. With corporate taxes, Modigliani and Miller (1963) also show that the cost of equity is positively related to the firm's leverage ratio. The same result is implied by Dhaliwal et al. (2006) who expand Modigliani and Miller (1963) to include investor level taxes. Using implied cost-ofequity estimates and proxies for the firm's corporate tax rate and the personal tax disadvantage of debt, Dhaliwal et al. (2006) conclude that the cost of equity is positively associated with leverage. Accordingly, we expect the cost of equity to be positively associated with the firm's leverage ratio. Fama and French (1992) find that realized stock returns are positively related to the book-to-market ratio, implying a negative association between the market-to-book ratio and the implied cost of equity. Recent empirical studies on the implied cost of equity (e.g., Gebhardt et al., 2001; Gode and Mohanram, 2003; Hail and Leuz, 2006) report evidence consistent with the findings of Fama and French's (1992) . Accordingly, we expect a negative association between the market-to-book ratio and the implied cost of equity.
Market-to-Book Ratio (MARKET TO BOOK):
Long-term Growth Rate (GROWTH_RATE): Gebhardt et al. (2001) and Gode and
Mohanram (2003), among others, measure the firm's long-term growth rate by the five-year earnings growth rate available in I/B/E/S, and they find a positive association between the earnings growth rate and the implied cost of equity. This evidence suggests that the market perceives high growth firms as riskier, consistent with the asset pricing theory. Consequently, we expect a positive association between the cost of equity and the expected long-term earnings growth rate.
Dispersion of Analyst Forecasts (VAR_ANALYSTCOV): A higher dispersion in earnings
forecasts implies greater disagreement among analysts, thus causing greater uncertainty about forecasted earnings per share and a higher cost of equity. Empirical evidence provided by Gode and Mohanram (2003) is consistent with this point of view. Therefore, we expect a positive association between the cost of equity and the dispersion of analyst forecasts.
Inflation (INFL):
Analyst forecasts, stock prices, the book value of equity-the key inputs of the cost of equity-are all expressed in nominal terms and local currencies.
Consequently, our estimates of the cost of equity reflect the country's expected inflation rate.
Following Hail and Leuz (2006), we control for the expected inflation rate, measuring it as the annualized yearly median of a country-specific, one-year-ahead realized monthly inflation rate.
GDP Growth (GDPG):
We incorporate GDP growth per capita to control for crosscountry differences in the level of economic development. We also introduce GDPG, which may capture country fixed effects, to control for potential country-specific unobservable or omitted variables.
Industry Membership (INDUSTRY CONTROLS):
Several empirical studies on the cost of equity (e.g., Gebhardt et al. (2001) , Gode and Mohanram (2003) and Hail and Leuz (2006) , among others) show that the firm's implied cost of equity is positively and significantly associated with its industry membership. To control for this effect, we introduce a set of dummy variables representing the 12 industries in Campbell (1996).
Empirical Analysis
To test our predictions in H 1 and H 2 , we regress the privatized firm's cost of equity on the government control, political, and institutional variables, while controlling for standard firmand country-level determinants of the cost of equity. More specifically, we estimate several specifications of the following general model: Megginson and Netter (2001) identify some methodological shortcomings (mainly related to selection bias) that weaken existing empirical studies on the impact of privatization on corporate performance. One of the selection bias problems is related to the fact that, in order to make privatization "attractive", the government may divest the "healthiest" and the "easiest" firms first (Megginson and Netter (2001) ). Therefore, government control may be systematically related to both unobservable and observable firm characteristics. Following several privatization studies (e.g., Villalonga (2000) , Boubakri et al. (2005) and Gupta (2005)), we address selection bias by estimating a fixed-effects model. We believe that a particular firm exhibits the same characteristics as the whole industry. Governments generally privatize firms from particular industries using the same timing and sales methods. Therefore, using industry-fixed effects allows us to control for unobservable selection effects. Panel B provides Pearson correlation coefficients between the regression variables. The correlation coefficients that are significant at the 1% level are shown in bold. Consistent with our predictions in H 1 , we find that GOVCONT is significantly and positively correlated with the cost of equity at the 1% level over our five-year post-privatization window. This initial evidence is consistent with the political interference hypothesis that higher government control is associated with greater post-privatization political interference and thus with a higher cost of equity. We also find that the correlation coefficients between the cost of equity and the political economy variables are highly significant, giving initial support for our conjecture in H 2 that the political characteristics of the privatizing government are priced. Additionally, we find that all institutional variables are negatively correlated at the 1% level with the cost of equity, except for ANTISELF. We generally report lower correlation coefficients between government control, the political economy variables, and our control variables, respectively, thus mitigating multicollinearity concerns that could affect our regression results. As expected, the pairwise correlation coefficients between the institutional variables are high. Given that, we follow the recent literature on the cost of equity (e.g., Hail and Leuz (2006) ) by separately controlling for our institutional variables. Table 5 reports the results from estimating equation (1) for the five-year postprivatization window. In all models, we control for firm-and country-level determinants of the firm's cost of equity. In Model 1, our basic regression, we only include the government control and political economy test variables. The model provides evidence which confirms our predictions in H 1 and H 2 : that the cost of equity of NPFs is related to government control and the political characteristics of the privatizing government. The coefficient of GOVCONT is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that higher government control is associated with higher post-privatization political interference and thus with a higher cost of equity. This finding is consistent with the political interference hypothesis. We can interpret it as implying that minority shareholders will anticipate the post-privatization political interference and discount the share prices, hence raising the cost of equity financing and potentially reducing the ability of the NPF to fund its investments. The coefficient of LEFT is positive, but is not statistically distinguishable from zero. Therefore, our regression results do not support our conjecture: It turns out that firms from countries whose left-wing governments pose a higher policy risk are not penalized by higher equity financing costs. The coefficient of SYSTEM is negative and significant at the 1% level, implying that firms from countries with a higher political system index benefit from a lower cost of equity. This suggests that firms from more democratic countries should be able to count on a lower cost of equity. This evidence is consistent with the argument that post-privatization policy risk is lower in more democratic countries. Furthermore, the coefficient of YRSOFFC is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the cost of equity is decreasing in the number of years that the government has been in power. This finding implies that governments which have been in power for a long time are more stable and are associated with a lower policy risk and thus with a lower cost of equity.
Main Evidence
In Models 2 through 5, we separately control for the institutional variables. We find that the coefficient of GOV_EXPROP is negative and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that a higher risk of government expropriation is associated with a higher cost of equity. We can interpret this finding as implying that shareholders in NPFs from countries with greater state intervention in the economy will require higher returns on their investments in such firms. We also find that the coefficient of DISCLOSURE is negative and significant at the 10% level, indicating that is a higher quality of accounting standards is associated with a lower cost of equity. This evidence is consistent with Hail and Leuz's (2006) finding that more extensive disclosure requirements are associated with a lower cost of equity. Furthermore, we find that the coefficient of ANTISELF is negative and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that better legal investor protection is associated with a lower cost of equity. This evidence is consistent with recent studies on the implied cost of equity (e.g., Hail and Leuz (2006) , among others) which find that firms from countries with sounder legal institutions benefit from a lower cost of equity.
However, we find that the coefficient of LAW_ORDER is negative, but is not significant. Therefore, our results provide no evidence that the country's law-and-order influences the cost of equity of NPFs. More importantly, for our purposes, we continue to estimate the positive and highly significant relation between GOVCONT and the cost of equity as well as the negative and significant association at the 1% level between SYSTEM, YRSOFFC, and the cost of equity. In
Model 6, we include all of our institutional variables and we find that, as concerns the impact that government control and the political economy variables have on the cost of equity of NPFs, our inferences remain materially unchanged.
Turning to our firm-and country-level control variables, we find that the coefficient of our proxy for firm size is negative and highly significant. This evidence is consistent with the findings of Fama and French (1992) and Gebhardt et al. (2001) (2006), we find that the coefficient of our proxy for the country's expected inflation rate, INFL, is positive and significant at the 1% level across all models. Finally, the coefficient of GDPG doesn't seem to explain the cost of equity. A possible explanation of this finding is that our institutional variables capture the cross-country differences on the development level.
Insert Table 5 about here
The analysis of the impact of government control and political economy variables on the cost of equity presented in table 5 is extended in table 6 , where we control for the following privatization variables: (i) privatization progress, (ii) golden share, (iii) local institutional control, and (iv) foreign control. Privatization sustainability may affect policy risk and thus the cost of equity of privatized firms. Perotti (1995) argues that privatization sustainability transmits a credible signal of government commitment to investors. Additionally, Perotti and Laeven (2002) argue that only a sustained and consistent privatization program can convey a credible signal that eliminates policy risk. Therefore, we predict that sustained privatization will decrease policy risk, and thus be negatively associated with the cost of equity. To capture sustained privatization, we use PRIV_PROGRESS, which is the cumulated average of privatization proceeds to GDP. 10 Data on privatization proceeds come from SDC Platinuim and data on GDP are collected from World Development Indicators. Golden share, which can be defined as a mechanism by which governments can maintain their control over privatized firms, may also influence the cost of equity. By retaining a golden share governments may gain special veto power over the firm's major decisions such as merger and hostile takeover or may impose constraints on other owners such as limits on their voting rights. 11 The data on golden shares come mainly from Bortolotti and Siniscalco (2004) and Megginson (2003) .
Furthermore, the presence of foreigners as large shareholders may influence the NPF's equity financing costs. In fact, foreign owners, moved by several concerns, maintain strict control over managers' actions (Frydman et al. (1999) and D'Souza et al. (2005)). These concerns include reputation, corporate governance expertise etc. In addition, foreign owners require a high quality of accounting information. For example, Stulz (1999) shows that the openness of domestic capital markets to foreign investors is associated with a higher demand for good corporate governance and higher corporate transparency. Therefore, foreign control which may result in better monitoring and a higher quality of accounting information should be associated with a lower cost of equity. Additionally, local institutional investors as large shareholders in NPFs may also affect the cost of equity. Boubakri et al. (2005) report results suggesting that local institutions may be an effective mechanism of post-privatization corporate governance.
Therefore, we expect a negative association between the cost of equity and local institutional investors' control.
10 See Perotti and Laeven (2002) for the details on the calculation of this variable.
11 Bortolotti and Faccio (2007 p. 10 ) define golden share used by the government to maintain control over privatized firms as: "the system of the State's special powers and statutory constraints on privatized companies. Typically, special powers include (i) the right to appoint members in corporate boards; (ii) the right to consent to or to veto the acquisition of relevant interests in the privatized companies; (iii) other rights such as to consent to the transfer of subsidiaries, dissolution of the company, ordinary management, etc. The above mentioned rights may be temporary or not. On the other hand, statutory constraints include (i) ownership limits; (ii) voting caps; (iii) national control provisions."
Model (1) indicates that the coefficient of PRIV_PROGRESS is negative and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that privatization sustainability is indeed associated with a lower policy risk and thus a lower cost of equity. This evidence supports Perotti's conjecture (1995) that privatization sustainability provides a credible signal of government commitment and reduces policy risk. Model (2) shows a positive and significant relation at the 10% level between golden share and the cost of equity GOLDEN_SHARE, indicating that special powers are associated with a higher cost of equity. However, Model (3) reveals an insignificant relation between foreign control and the cost of equity. Therefore, our results do not provide support for the conjecture that the presence of foreign investors in NPFs is associated with a lower cost of equity.
Model (4) More interestingly for our purposes, we go on to estimate a positive and highly significant relation between GOVCONT and the cost of equity across the four models as well as a highly significant association between SYSTEM, YRSOFFC and the cost of equity. These findings are consistent with those reported in table 5 and provide additional support for our predictions in H 1 and H 2 : that the cost of equity of NPFs is related to government control and the political characteristics of the privatizing government.
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Sensitivity Tests
In this section, we conduct a battery of sensitivity tests to ensure the robustness of our findings. The results of our main sensitivity tests reported in Table 7 generally reinforce our core findings in Table 5 and Table 6 : that the cost of equity of privatized firms is related to government control and the political characteristics of the privatizing government.
Alternative Control Variables.
The empirical studies on the implied cost of equity (e.g., In our main empirical analysis we use INFL to control for cross-country differences in expected future inflation rates. In Model (3), we replace INFL by local risk-free rates, R f , which is equal to yields of local treasury bills, central bank papers, or interbank loans from Datastream. 12 Controlling for local risk free rates allows us to capture several cross-country differences beyond those in expected inflation rates or interest rate regimes. Model (3) indicates that our main 12 Hail and Leuz (2006 p. 517) use a similar argument to motivate this sensitivity test. They note: "our design assumes that differences in the nominal risk-free rate stem only from differences in expected inflation rates. Although this assumption is common in the international finance literature, it is likely that real interest rates differ across countries, reflecting, among other things, saving rates or interest rate regimes. Thus, it would be desirable to control for the real risk free rate in each country." previous results and inferences remain materially unchanged after controlling for local risk free rates.
Alternative Political Economy Variables.
Several recent studies examining the link between politics and corporate governance and transparency (e.g., Bushman et al. (2004) and Durnev and Fauver (2007) ) use variables from Polity V. We check the sensitivity of our inferences about the role of politics by using alternative political economy variables from Polity V. In model (4), we replace our political economy variables from DPI by the autocratic index, AUTOCRACY, which is calculated as the difference between Polity V's autocratic index and Polity V's democratic index. The autocratic index measures the general secrecy of political institutions, whereas the democratic index measures the general openness of political institutions. We find that the coefficient of AUTOCRACY is positive and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that the risk of expropriation of shareholders' wealth is higher under autocratic governments.
Endogeneity of Government Control.
One potential concern is that GOVCONT itself may not be exogenous. In fact, the control rights held by the government may be determined by unobserved variables that also affect the cost of equity, which can lead to biased and inconsistent OLS estimates. We address this issue by using an instrumental variable approach.
The instrumental variables must be highly correlated with GOVCONT but not with our estimate of the implied cost of equity i.e., R AVG . We use the country's legal origins as an instrumental variable. Specifically, we use a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 for firms from common law countries, and zero otherwise. The significant relation between government ownership and control and legal rights has been well documented in the finance literature (e.g., Bortolotti and
Faccio (2007)). We estimate our basic model in table 5, using two-stage least squares regression.
In the first stage, we predict GOVCONT using the country's legal origin as well as all of the other independent variables used in Model 1 of Model 5. Importantly, we find that the coefficient of GOVCONT is positive and significant at the 5% level, indicating that our previous findings are not due to the endogenous nature of GOVCONT.
Alternative estimations and specifications.
We use an alternative approach to control for cross-country differences in expected inflation rates. The approach consists in subtracting the expected inflation rates from the implied cost of equity estimates and using an inflation-adjusted cost of equity as a dependent variable. However, we acknowledge that this approach has the drawback of forcing a coefficient of minus one on our proxy for the expected inflation rates.
Model (6), in which we use risk premia, we find that the coefficient of GOVCONT is positive and significant at the 5% level. However, our political economy variables become insignificant.
Similarly to Hail and Leuz (2006), we find that the fit from this model (R 2 =0.242) is lower than that from models in which we simply add the expected inflation rate as an explanatory variable.
As outlined in section 3.1, we use analyst forecasts and the stock price at the fiscal year end +10 months and financial data at the fiscal year end. This time lag allows the firm's financial information to be publicly traded and incorporated in prices. To ensure that our results are not affected by this time lag, we discount for each model the fiscal year end +10 months price to the fiscal year end using the corresponding implied cost of equity. 13 The unreported results show that GOVCONT remains positive and significant at the 5% level and SYSTEM and YRSOFFC continue to load negative and significant at the 1% level. Therefore, our results are not affected by the fact that we use stock prices at the fiscal year end +10 months together with financial data at the fiscal year end.
We test the sensitivity of our findings to alternative assumptions on the long-term growth rate. In our previous analysis, we assume that the long-term growth rate is equal to the country's expected inflation rate. This assumption affects only the CLS and OJ model that have the long-term growth rate as an output. We replace the country's expected inflation rate by a fixed constant rate of 3% for all countries. The unreported results show that GOVCONT continue to load positive and significant. We also find that SYSTEM and YRSOFFC remain positive and highly significant. Consequently, our findings are not driven by any particular assumption on the long term growth rate.
Finally, we use the four individual estimates of the cost of equity R OJ , R CT , R GLS and R ES to examine the impact of government control and the political characteristics of the privatizing government on the cost of equity. The unreported results show that SYSTEM and YRSOFFC generally continue to load negative and significant across all models. We also find that GOVCONT is positive and significant when the dependent variable is R CT or R OJ and insignificant when the dependent variable is R GLS or R ES . These findings are consistent with those of Botosan and Plumlee (2005) : that the correlation coefficients between the implied cost of equity and the risk factors will vary across different models. These findings are also consistent with those of Dhaliwal (2006): that the impact of taxes and leverage on the cost of equity will vary across the four models. 14 Overall, these findings outline the caveat associated with the use of a single model to estimate the implied cost of equity.
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Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate the effects of government control and the political characteristics of the privatizing government on the cost of equity of newly privatized firms. To do so, we use a unique sample of 126 firms from industrialized (19) and developing (6) countries that were privatized between 1987 and 2003. Descriptive information on our ultimate ownership data shows that the largest ultimate owner of the privatized firms is most frequently the state.
More specifically, we find that the state remains the largest ultimate owner of most firms in our sample even five years after privatization.
Using the cost of equity estimates (derived from the discounted cash flow method), we find strong evidence that it is increasing in government control, after controlling for firm-level and country-level variables that are shown to affect the cost of equity. This finding implies that minority shareholders, anticipating some level of post-privatization political interference, discount the share prices, hence raising the cost of equity financing for newly privatized firms.
This behavior could adversely affect the ability of these firms to fund their investments and growth. We also find that the cost of equity of privatized firms is significantly related to the political system and the government's stability (tenure). More specifically, we find evidence that firms from countries with democratic and more stable governments enjoy a lower cost of equity.
Therefore, our findings suggest that the presence of sound political institutions reduce the compensation demanded by shareholders for holding equity in privatized firms where the government is still a partial owner.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the link between political economy and corporate finance (e.g., Durnev and Fauver (2007) and Bushman et al. (2004) ) by showing that corporate financing decisions are affected by the quality of political institutions. We also add to the literature on the external financing costs of privatized firms (e.g., Borisova (2007) who looks at the cost of debt of such firms). This issue is important, since the survival of the privatized firms (and hence the success of the privatization process) depends to a large extent on their easy access to new funding resources on capital markets, at a reasonable cost. Overall, economic growth is also at stake, for when newly privatized firms can borrow money on capital markets at lower costs this enables them to carry forward value-enhancing and positive net-presentvalue projects that will foster economic growth.
We first define the following variables that are common to the four models: 
where
This model is derived from the abnormal earnings valuation model developed by Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) . It uses one-year-ahead and two-years-ahead earnings per share, the future dividend per share and a proxy of the long term growth rate. The future dividend, t i DPS  , is estimated as t i FEPS  multiplied by POUT . The asymptotic long term growth rate, lt g , is calculated using the annualized yearly median of a country specific one-year-ahead realised monthly inflation rates. lt g constitutes a lower bound for the cost of equity estimates.
Claus and Thomas (2001) 5 5 4 1 5 1
(1 )
In this model the price is a function of the future forecasted earnings per share, the book value per share and the asymptotic long term growth rate. Claus and Thomas (2001) 
APPENDIX
Models of Implied cost of equity estimates
Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001) Easton (2004) 2 1 1 2
To implement the model, Easton (2004) 
Variable
Definition Source RAVG Dependent variable, our estimate of the cost of equity, which is the average cost of equity estimated using the four models described in the Appendix.
Authors' estimation
GOVCONT
The ultimate control rights held by the government.
Authors' calculation
LEFT
A dummy variable equal to one for the left oriented government, and 0 otherwise.
Database of Political Institutions
SYSTEM
Political system index: Direct Presidential (0); Strong president elected by assembly (1); Parliamentary (2).
Database of Political Institutions
YRSOFFC
The years that the chief has been in office.
Database of Political Institutions
GOV_EXPROP
ICRG's assessment of the risk of outright confiscation or forced nationalization by the state. Scale from 0 to 10, with higher scores for lower risk.
La Porta et al.
LAW_ORDER
The ICRG assessment of both the strength and impartiality of the legal system (law component) and popular observance of the law (order component). Scale from 0 to 6, with higher scores indicating sound political institutions and a strong court system.
International Country Risk
Guide.
DISCLOSURE
The ratings for disclosure standards based on inclusion or omission of 90 items in the annual reports.
ANTISELF
Average of ex-ante and ex-post private control of self-dealing. Djankov et al.
SIZE
The logarithm of the firm's total assets in US dollar. Worldscope
RETURN_VOL
The annual standard deviation of monthly stock returns.
Authors' calculation
LEVERAGE
Total book value of debt divided by the sum of market value of equity and the book value of debt.
Worldscope
MARKET TO BOOK The market-to-book ratio. Worldscope GROWTH_RATE Five year growth rate from I/B/E/S. If this rate isn't available in I/B/E/S we estimate it using forecasted second and third years earnings per share.
I/B/E/S
VAR_ANALYSTCOV Standard deviation of estimated first year earnings per share divided by average forecasted first year earnings per share.
Authors' calculation
INFL
The annualized yearly median of a country specific one-year-ahead realised monthly inflation rate. Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001), and Easton (2004) . RGLS is the average of the four estimates for the implied cost of equity. Detailed description of theses models is given in the Appendix. is the average cost of equity estimated using the four models described in the Appendix. Definitions and data sources for the explanatory variables are outlined in Table A1 . Beneath each estimate is reported the z-statistic. The superscripts asterisks ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, one-tailed when directional predictions are made, and two-tailed otherwise. R AVG is the average cost of equity estimated using the four models described in the Appendix. The definitions and data sources for the variables are outlined in Table A1 . The superscripts asterisks ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, one-tailed when directional predictions are made, and two-tailed otherwise. R AVG is the average cost of equity estimated using the four models described in the Appendix. The definitions and data sources for the variables are outlined in Table A1 . The superscripts asterisks ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, one-tailed when directional predictions are made, and two-tailed otherwise. R AVG is the average cost of equity estimated using the four models described in the Appendix. The definitions and data sources for the variables are outlined in Table A1 .
